Ruth B. Hardy Revocable Trust, Delcon Corporation Profit Sharing Plan FBO A. Wesley Hardy AKA Delcon Corp. PSP FBO A. W. Hardy, Finesse P.S.P., MJS Real Properties LLC AKA MJS Real Properties, Uintah Investments, LLC AKA Uintah Investments David D. Smith, Steven Condie, David L. Johnson, Berrett PSP, VW Professional Homes PSP, Ty Thomas, and D.R.P. Management PSP v. Eagle Mountain Lots, L.L.C., AKA Eagle Mountain Lots, LLC, Grant Bybee, BBandS, LLC, Robert A. Jones DBA BBandS, LLC, The Circle of Builders, LLC., Royal Richards, Steven T. Gyuro, AKA Tom Gyuro, Eagle Mountain City and John Does I-X : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2011
Ruth B. Hardy Revocable Trust, Delcon
Corporation Profit Sharing Plan FBO A. Wesley
Hardy AKA Delcon Corp. PSP FBO A. W. Hardy,
Finesse P.S.P., MJS Real Properties LLC AKA MJS
Real Properties, Uintah Investments, LLC AKA
Uintah Investments David D. Smith, Steven
Condie, David L. Johnson, Berrett PSP, VW
Professional Homes PSP, Ty Thomas, and D.R.P.
Management PSP v. Eagle Mountain Lots, L.L.C.,
AKA Eagle Mountain Lots, LLC, Grant Bybee,
BBandS, LLC, Robert A. Jones DBA BBandS, LLC,
The Circle of Builders, LLC., Royal Richards,
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Hardy v. Eagle Mountain, No. 20110339 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2011).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/2855
Steven T. Gyuro, AKA Tom Gyuro, Eagle Mountain
City and John Does I-X : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Gerald H. Kinghorn; Jeremy R. Cook; Parsons Kinghorn Harris; Attorneys for Appellant Eagle
Mountain City.
James C. Swindler; Wayne G. Petty; Prince, Yates and Geldzahler; Attorney for Appellees.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
RUTH B. HARDY REVOCABLE TRUST, 
DELCON CORPORATION PROFIT SHARING 
PLAN FBO A. WESLEY HARDY AKA DELCON 
CORP. PSP FBO A. W. HARDY, FINESSE 
P.S.P., MJS REAL PROPERTIES LLC AKA 
MJS REALPROPERTIES, UINTAH 
INVESTMENTS, LLC AKA UINTAH 
INVESTMENTS, DAVID D. SMITH, STEVEN 
CONDIE, DAVID L. JOHNSON, BERRETT PSP, 
VW PROFESSIONAL HOMES PSP, TY 
THOMAS, AND D.R.P. MANAGEMENT PSP, 
Plaintiffs and Appellees, 
vs. 
EAGLE MOUNTAIN LOTS, L.L.C. AKA EAGLE 
MOUNTAIN LOTS, LLC, GRANT BYBEE, 
BB&S, LLC, ROBERT A. JONES DBA BB&S, 
LLC, THE CIRCLE OF BUILDERS, L.L.C, 
ROYAL RICHARDS, HOMESPIN, LLC, EAGLE 
MOUNTAIN CITY AND JOHN DOES I-X, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 20110339 CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
APPEAL FROM ORDER OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT, UTAH COUNTY, THE HONORABLE 
STEVEN L. HANSEN, GRANTING APPELLEES' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING 
EAGLE MOUNTAIN CITY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY FILED 
JUDGMENT UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
OCT 17 2011 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAI ,S OF THE 
STATE OF I ITAI I 
Ri JTI i B. HARDY REVOCABLE TRUST, 
DELCON CORPORATION PROFIT SHARING 
PLAN FBO A. WESLEY HARDY AKA DELCON 
CORP. PSP FBO A. W. HARDN , FINKSSI-
P„S l \ , MJSRi- U PUOPERIHSI.I.C \k 
MJS REALPROPERTIES, 1 !IM MI 
INVESTMENTS, LLC AKA UINTAII 
INVESTMENTS, DAVID D. SMITH, STEVEN 
CONDIE, DAVID L. JOHNSON, BERRETT PSP, 
VW PROFESSIONAI , HOMES PSP, T\ 
THOMAS, AND D.R.P. M ANAGEMENTPSP, 
I Mail itiffs ai tcf Appellees. 
vs. 
EAGLE MOUNTAIN LOTS, L.L.C. AKA EAGI T: 
MOUNTAIN LOTS, LLC, GRANT BYBEE, 
BB&S, LLC , ROBER'I A. JONES DBA BB&S, 
LLC, THE CIRCLE OF BUILDERS, L.I A .. 
RON vi RICH VRDS,HOMESPI V. I \X\ F. \CA E 
MOUN'I \ i \ r n \ \ND JOHN D o h i -v 
Defendai its ai id Vppellai its 
CJ iseN< ). 20110339 C A 
BRIEF OF APPEI J ,EES 
APPEAL FROM ORDER o|- I III-' I OURTH JUDICIAI, 
DISTRICT COURT, UTAH COUNTY, THE HONORABLE 
STEVEN ! HANSEN. GRANTING \PPEEI EES' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY Jl MXiMI-N 1 AM) DENYING 
EAGLE MOUNTAIN rvvvK MOTION- I MR S I M M A R Y 
JUDGMENT 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
James C. Swindler (#3177) Gerald H. Kinghorn 
Wayne G. Petty (#2596) Jeremy R. Cook 
Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler Parsons Kinghorn Harris 
175 East 400 South, Suite 900 A Professional Corporation 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 111 East Broadway, 11th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorney for Appellees Attorneys for Appellant Eagle Mountain 
City 
ii Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 1 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 7 
ARGUMENT 9 
I. BY VIRTUE OF UTAH CODE §73-1-11, THE TRUST DEED CONVEYED 
A LIEN ON THE 160 ACRE FEET 9 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO CONSIDER EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE 
OF THE PARTIES' "INTENT" WAS CORRECT AND SHOULD BE 
AFFIRMED ON THE ALTERNATIVE GROUND THAT SUCH EVIDENCE 
DID NOT SUPPORT THE CITY'S POSITION 11 
III. THE TRIAL COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE TRUST DEED WAS 
CORRECT AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED ON TWO ALTERNATIVE 
GROUNDS IN ANY EVENT 15 
IV. UTAH CODE § 73-1-1 l(5)(e) SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED IN A 
MANNER THAT PRODUCES ABSURD RESULTS 17 
V. IN VIEW OF THE AVOIDED FRAUDULENT TRANSFER, THE CITY 
WOULD NOT BENEFIT FROM RELIANCE ON UTAH CODE § 73-1-
ll(5)(e) 20 
VI. SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE FRAUDULENT TRANSFER CLAIM 
SHOULD BE AFFIRMED 20 
VII. THE PROVISION OF THE JUDGMENT DIRECTING THE SHERIFF TO 
SELL THE WATER RIGHT ENTITLEMENTS SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.. 25 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 29 
ADDENDUM TO BRIEF OF APPELLEES 30 
iii Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Bearden v. Wardley Corp., 2003 UT App 171 9 
Bergerv. Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co., 723 P.2d 388 (Utah 1986) 17 
Dainesv. Vincent, 2008 UT 51 12 
Doctors' Co. v. Drezga, 2009 UT 60 16 
Floresv. Earnshaw, 2009 UT App 90 13 
Home Sav. and Loan v. Aetna Cas. andSur. Co., 817 P.2d 341 (Utah App. 1991) 17 
iw re AM, 2009 UT App 118 16 
In re Agricultural Research and Technology Group, Inc., 916 F„2d 528, 535 (9th Cir. 1990)22 
Jensen ex rel. Jensen v. Cunningham, 2011 UT 17 14 
Kramerv. State Retirement Bd., 2008 UT App 351 28 
Loosle v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan, 858 P.2d 999 (Utah 1993) 10, 12 
New Jersey Dept. of Environmental Protection v. Caldeira, 768 A.2d 782, 793 (N.J. 
Super.A.D. 2001) 22 
New Jersey Dept. of Environmental Protection v. Caldeira, 794 A.2d 156 (NJ. 2002) 22 
Searle v. Searle, 2001 UT App 367 27 
Spears v. Warr, 2002 UT 24 12 
State ex rel. Z.C, 2007 UT 54 19 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-5(1) 21 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-5(l)(a) 21 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-6 21 
Utah Code Ann. §25-6-8(1) 21 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-8(4) 22 
Utah Code Ann. §25-6-9(1) 21 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-9(2) 23 
Utah Code Ann. §73-1-11 9, 10, 16, 17 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-11(1) 7, 8, 12, 16 
Utah Code Ann. §73-1-1 l(5)(b) 11 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-1 l(5)(b)(ii) 16 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-1 l(5)(b)(vi) 3, 16 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-1 l(5)(c)(ii) 10 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-1 l(5)(e) 8, 17, 20 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-10 3 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-17 3, 10 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j) 1 
Rules 
Utah R. Civ. P. 59 27 
IV Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)0). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellees do not believe that it would be helpful to the Court to submit a 
statement regarding the nature of the case, the course of proceedings or the disposition in 
the trial court. They do, however, submit the following Statement of Facts (cited herein 
as "Facts"). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiffs/Appellees ("Lenders") made a $3.3 million loan (the "Loan") to 
Eagle Mountain Lots, L.L.C. ("EML") on or about May 25, 2007, when the closing 
occurred. Affidavit/Declaration of Justin G. Sutherland ("Sutherland Declaration") 
1HJ4-10, R494-96, and Exhibit G thereto, R425-27; Declaration of John C. Strasser 
("Strasser Declaration") ffl|5-8, R649-50. 
2. The Loan was evidenced by a Promissory Note (the "Note") executed by 
EML. Sutherland Declaration, ^8-9 , R494-95, and Exhibit C thereto, R447-51; 
Deposition of Robert A. Jones ("Jones Depo.") at 17-18, R590-91, and Exhibit 3 thereto, 
R576-79; Strasser Declaration TJ9, R649, and Exhibit A thereto, R640-44. 
3. The Note was secured by a Trust Deed executed by EML affecting 
approximately 158 acres of land in Eagle Mountain City (the "Land"). Sutherland 
Declaration, |^10, R494, and Exhibit E thereto, R434-40; Jones Depo. at 1.8-19, R589-90, 
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and Exhibit 4 thereto, R570-75; Strasser Declaration ^9, R649, and Exhibit B thereto, 
R633-38. Lenders claimed that the Trust Deed also encumbered 160 acre feet of water 
rights (the "160 Acre Feet"). Third Amended Complaint, ffl[2, 13-14, R148-150. 
Extension of Loan Maturity and Default by EML Under the Note 
4. EML paid an extension fee to Lenders, whereby the maturity date of the 
Note was extended to May 18, 2008. Strasser Declaration, J^ 14(a), R648. 
5. EML defaulted under the Note in that, among other things, it failed to pay 
interest due on February 18, 2008, and thereafter and failed to pay any part of the 
indebtedness owing under the Note when it came due on May 18, 2008 or at any time 
thereafter. Strasser Declaration, ffi[13, 14, R647-48. 
6. The entire balance owing under the Note came due on May 18, 2008, and 
was never paid. Strasser Declaration, ^|13, R648. 
Interest Claimed by Eagle Mountain City (the "City") 
7. The City claimed an interest in Water Right Number 54-1225 (a33129) (the 
"Water Right") or water associated with said Water Right by virtue of a conveyance it 
received from Circle of Builders on or about August 30, 2007. Answer of Eagle 
Mountain City, ^[11, R182; Third Amended Complaint, R149; Exhibit H to Memorandum 
supporting City's Motion, R350. 
160 Acre Feet of Water Rights Appurtenant to the Land 
8. As of the May 2007 closing of EML's purchase of the Land and 160 Acre 
Feet, the annual period of use of the 160 Acre Feet was from April 1 to October 31. See 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Certificate of Beneficial Use, R519-20. That Certificate constitutes a certificate of 
appropriation within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-17. 
9. The 160 Acre Feet had been used to irrigate the Land for the previous ten 
years before the May 2007 closing of the Loan. Berry Depo. at 56:1-5, R546. 
10. On January 27, 1995, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-10, the Division 
of Water Rights approved an Application for Permanent Change of Water, R515-18. 
Such action constitutes an approval of an application to permanently change the place of 
use of water within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-1 l(5)(b)(vi). 
Fraudulent Transfer of Water Rights by EML 
11. EML acquired the 160 Acre Feet using proceeds of the Loan. Jones Depo. 
at 20:25, through 21:6, R587-88; Depo. Exh. 5, R568-69 (authenticated by Jones at 
R589). 
12. On or about June 22, 2007, EML transferred the 160 Acre Feet to Circle of 
Builders. Jones Depo. at 29:22, through 31:14, R584-86, and Depo. Exhibit 8, R559-60. 
13. EML did not receive anything from Circle of Builders in return for the 160 
Acre Feet. Jones Depo. at 31:15, through 32:10, R583-84; 20:6-18, R588; 64:10-12, 
R582; Depo. Exhibit 7, R561-67.1 
1
 Although Jones initially testified that EML received the contract for 1,125 acre feet of 
water rights marked as Depo. Exhibit 7 in return for the 160 Acre Feet, he ultimately 
conceded that EML did not own the 1,125 acre feet. On its face, Exhibit 7 shows that 
Circle of Builders conveyed the 1,125 acre feet to Mark and Brenda Rindlesbach in 
December 2007. 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14. Apart from the Land and 160 Acre Feet of water rights, EML did not own 
any other assets. Jones Depo. at 19:25, through 20:18; 20:25, through 21:6, R587-89. 
15. As of June 22, 2007, the Land (exclusive of water rights conveyed on that 
date to Circle of Builders) had a fair market value of $1,990,000. Declaration of Paul W. 
Throndsen,R652-718. 
16. As of June 22, 2007, EML owed Lenders the entire $3.3 million principal 
balance of the Loan plus interest accrued thereon in the amount of $49,183.38. Strasser 
Declaration, f 12, R648-49. 
17. As of June 22, 2007, EML owed Summit 1031 Exchange for the benefit of 
Weston Glade Berry and Zane R. Berry the entire principal amount of $637,875 and 
accrued interest owing under a Promissory Note signed by EML in connection with the 
closing of EML's purchase of the Land and 160 Acre Feet. Berry Depo. at 39:20, 
through 42:9, R550-53; 45:3-8, R548, and Exhibit 9 thereto, R535-37. 
18. As of June 22, 2007, EML owed Steven Glade Berry the entire principal 
amount of $212,625 and accrued interest owing under a Promissory Note signed by EML 
in connection with the closing of EML's purchase of the Land and 160 Acre Feet. Berry 
Depo. at 42:14, through 43:3, R549-50; 45:3-8, R548, and Exhibit 10 thereto, R532-34. 
19. In the negotiations regarding water rights prior to the closing of the Loan 
Lenders were willing to exchange (i.e., agree to a substitution of collateral whereby they 
would forego) the 160 Acre Feet in return for 1125 acre feet of other water rights. Robert 
A. Jones testified: 
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Q. [Mr. Swindler]. What I'm trying to do is make sure that we understand 
your testimony as well as we can. 
A. My testimony is clear, I think. They forewent the 160 acre feet and 
allowed it to release in exchange for the 1,125 acre feet and were thrilled 
about it. 
(Emphasis added.) Jones Depo. at 64:4-9, R582. Similarly, Jones testified: 
A. The deal was, Hey, if you want all 1,125 acre feet you have to let me 
have the 160 acre feet. I have some things I could use it for. 
Jones Depo. at 72:12-14, R580. 
20. EML never performed its side of that exchange or substitution of 
collateral in that it never pledged the 1,125 acre feet to Lenders. Further, EML never had 
an interest in the 1,125 acre feet that it could have conveyed. Mr. Jones testified: 
Q. What Pm trying to do is make sure that we understand your 
testimony as well as we can. 
A. My testimony is clear, I think. They forewent the 160 acre feet and 
allowed it to release in exchange for the 1,125 acre feet and were thrilled 
about it. 
Q. The 1,125 acre feet did not belong to Eagle Mountain Lots. 
A. It did not. 
Q. Did it belong to Circle of Builders? 
A. Not at the time it was collateralized. It belonged to Mark 
Rindlesbach or whatever entity he held it in. 
Q. We haven't been focusing on those dates but the chronology we 
have is Exhibit 6, the water purchase contract, John Jacob. It's got a date of 
December c06. 
A. Okay. 
5 
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Q. Then the note and trust deed are May of '07. 
A. Okay. 
Q. Then Exhibit 7, where the water goes to Rindlesbach, is December 
of '07. So we have-
A. Okay. 
Q. We have a closing on the loan right in the middle, almost right in the 
middle of that one-year period. So at the time the loan was made by 
my clients, at the time you bought the land, the water was not Mark 
Rindlesbach's water. 
A. Well, it still was partially. 
Q. He was still seven months away from getting it. But it did belong to 
Circle of Builders, did it not? 
A. Sounds like it may have. 
Q. And Circle of Builders did not sign a mortgage or a trust deed in 
favor of my clients, did it? 
A. I don't know. Circle of Builders didn't have anything to do with the 
deal with your clients. 
Jones Depo. at 64:4-25, R582; 65:1-17, R581. 
21. Lenders were unwilling to make the Loan to EML unless they received a 
security interest in substantial water rights in addition to the Land. Strasser Declaration, 
T|16,R647. 
22. EML never conveyed a security interest in the 1,125 acre feet of water to 
Lenders. Jones Depo. at 65:13-17, R581; Strasser Declaration, ^ 17, R647. 
6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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23. The trial court entered a Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure (the 
"Judgment") on March 9, 2011, directing the Utah County Sheriff to sell the Land and 
"the remaining (i.e., those which have not been released by Plaintiffs) banked 
entitlements (106.72 acre feet in total) of Water Right Number 54-1225 (a33129) 
(hereinafter the 'Water Right Entitlements')" at public auction. R910-15. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court's decision that the Trust Deed included the 160 Acre Feet of water 
rights was based largely on Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-11(1). In its Brief the City 
acknowledges that this statute is "central" to its appeal, yet the City does not discuss it or 
make any argument that the trial court's application of the statute was incorrect. This 
issue has therefore been waived on appeal. Because the statute controls the outcome, the 
City's argument that the Trust Deed was ambiguous and that extrinsic evidence of intent 
should have been considered is rendered academic. But even if that issue is reviewed on 
its merits, there is no ambiguity to be found in the Trust Deed with respect to its inclusion 
of the 160 Acre Feet as appurtenant water rights. Moreover, the extrinsic evidence 
proffered by the City does not support its attempt to deprive Lenders of the 160 Acre 
Feet, but rather shows that Lenders would not have made the Loan without receiving 
water rights as collateral and that the borrower did not attempt to convey alternative 
water rights and did not even own them. The strained interpretation of the word "now" in 
the Trust Deed that is urged by the City also raises a purely academic issue in light of the 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
controlling provisions of Section 73-1-11(1). Further, the trial court's rejection of such 
interpretation as "artificial and unreasonably narrow" was correct. 
The City's argument that, by virtue of Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-1 l(5)(e), only 126.4 
acre feet of the 160 Acre Feet were included in the Trust Deed should be rejected for two 
reasons. First, the interpretation of the statute that the City relies upon would lead to 
absurd results. Second, because the trial court's alternative ruling avoided the fraudulent 
transfer of the 160 Acre Feet to the City's predecessor in interest, this issue makes no 
difference in the outcome unless the alternative ruling is also reversed. That ruling should 
be affirmed, as it was based on completely uncontroverted evidence and the City's theory 
of defense, that it was a good faith transferee and gave value to the debtor (EML), was 
properly rejected both because the City failed to plead that affirmative defense and 
because it submitted no evidence to support it. 
Finally, the City's complaint that the trial court ordered the sale of Water Right 
Entitlements, rather than the remainder of the 160 Acre Feet that Lenders had not 
released, should be rejected because (1) the City failed to preserve this issue by giving the 
trial court an opportunity to address it, (2) the City provided no evidence that the Water 
Right Entitlements were materially different in substance from the remaining portion of 
the 160 Acre Feet, (3) if the trial court made an error in this regard, it was invited error in 
view of the City's pleadings and arguments that treated the Water Right Entitlements as 
synonymous with, or the beneficial and equitable interest in, the 160 Acre Feet, and (4) 
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there is no meaningful relief that can be afforded the City on this issue because a 
Sheriffs sale of the 160 Acre Feet would put the City in no better position than it is now. 
ARGUMENT 
I. BY VIRTUE OF UTAH CODE § 73-1-11, THE TRUST DEED CONVEYED 
A LIEN ON THE 160 ACRE FEET. 
The Judgment was based on the trial court's Ruling and Order (the "Ruling") 
determining that, "as a matter of law the 160 Acre Feet were included in the conveyance 
effected by the Trust Deed as provided for in Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-11," R894, and that 
"[b]ecause none of the exceptions of Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-11 are present in this case, 
the appurtenant water rights (the 160 Acre Feet) passed with the Land in the Trust Deed." 
Id. The City's Brief (at 14-15) quotes this statute and acknowledges that it is "central" to 
its appeal, City's Brief at 13, but contains no analysis or discussion of the trial court's 
decision that the 160 Acre Feet were included in the Trust Deed by virtue of the statute. 
The City's silence on this pivotal issue constitutes an abandonment and waiver of the 
issue on appeal. See Bearden v. Wardley Corp., 2003 UT App 171, %5, 72 P.3d 144, 147. 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-11 provides in pertinent part as follows: 
(1) A water right appurtenant to land shall pass to the grantee of the land 
unless the grantor: 
(a) specifically reserves the water right or any part of the 
water right in the land conveyance document; 
(b) conveys a part of the water right in the land conveyance 
document; or 
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(c) conveys the water right in a separate conveyance 
document prior to or contemporaneously with the execution of the 
land conveyance document. 
The land conveyance that lies at the heart of this matter is the Trust Deed from EML 
(grantor) to Lenders (grantee). A trust deed is a land conveyance. See, Loosle v. First 
Fed. Sav. & Loan, 858 P.2d 999, 1002 (Utah 1993). The general rule established by 
section 73-1-11 is that appurtenant water rights pass with the land conveyance. None of 
the three exceptions to the general rule applies. First, the Trust Deed contains no 
reservation of any water rights. Second, the Trust Deed does not purport to convey only 
a part of the 160 Acre Feet; rather, it conveys all appurtenant water rights. Third, the 
grantor, EML, did not convey the 160 Acre Feet in a separate conveyance document prior 
to or contemporaneously with the Trust Deed. 
Further, the statute contains explicit criteria for determining whether a water right 
is appurtenant to land. Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-1 l(5)(c)(ii) provides: 
For purposes of land conveyances only, the land to which a 
water right is appurtenant is the authorized place of use of water as 
described in the . . . (iii) certificate [issued under Section 73-3-17 or] 
. . . (vi) approved application to permanently change the place of use 
of water. 
The 160 Acre Feet were used to irrigate the Land for at least ten years prior to the Trust 
Deed's execution in May 2007. Facts \9. The State Engineer issued a Certificate of 
Beneficial Use, reflecting a "change of point of diversion, place, or nature of use . . ." 
Facts T|8; see Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-17. By referring to all three (change of point of 
diversion, place and nature of use), the Certificate unquestionably establishes that the 160 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Acre Feet of water rights were appurtenant to the Land at the relevant time for purposes 
of the statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-1 l(5)(b). 
The 160 Acre Feet water right was appurtenant to the Land prior to the Berrys' 
conveyance to EML. The three Water Right Deeds and Assignments from the Berrys to 
EML were recorded simultaneously with the Berrys5 Warranty Deed to the Land. R621, 
540-45. Thus, the 160 Acre Feet were appurtenant to the Land while owned by Berrys 
and remained appurtenant to the Land when the water right and Land were conveyed to 
EML. 
Upon the conveyance of the water right to EML there was no change in the status 
of the water right vis-a-vis the Land; both the water right and the Land were owned by 
the same entity, EML. The foregoing authorities and analysis establish that the 160 Acre 
Feet appurtenant to the Land were conveyed by the Trust Deed. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO CONSIDER EXTRINSIC 
EVIDENCE OF THE PARTIES' "INTENT" WAS CORRECT AND 
SHOULD BE AFFIRMED ON THE ALTERNATIVE GROUND THAT 
SUCH EVIDENCE DID NOT SUPPORT THE CITY'S POSITION. 
The City argues that the trial court should have considered extrinsic evidence of 
the parties' "intent" such as preliminary discussions and negotiations regarding the 
collateral to be provided for the Loan, claiming the Trust Deed to be ambiguous. Such 
evidence was submitted in an effort to prove that the Lenders did not intend to receive the 
160 Acre Feet as collateral because they were to receive, in exchange for giving up that 
11 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
water right, 1125 acre feet of water rights that are listed in the Note. The trial court 
correctly refused to base its decision on such parol evidence for two principal reasons. 
First, not only does Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-11(1) control whether a water right is 
appurtenant to land for purposes of land conveyances, but it contains no exception based 
on the intent of the parties other than the three exceptions quoted above (reserving the 
water right, conveying only a part thereof or conveying the water right by a separate 
conveyance prior to or contemporaneous with the land conveyance). Thus, the trial court 
had no power to engraft upon the statute additional exceptions not contained in the plain 
language of the statute. 
Second, the Trust Deed is not ambiguous. It included all of the following in 
addition to the Land: 
all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon and all water rights, rights 
of way, easements, rents, issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, 
privileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging, now or hereafter used or 
enjoyed with said property, or any part thereof... . 
The phrase "all water rights . . . thereunto belonging" is not ambiguous. See Spears v. 
Warr, 2002 UT 24, ^40 (similar deed language ruled unambiguous); Loosle v. First Fed. 
Sav. & Loan, 858 P.2d 999, 1003 (Utah 1993) ("pursuant to section 73-1-11, a perfected 
water right will pass as an appurtenance without specifically mentioning the vested water 
r ight . . . .") . 
A finding of ambiguity after a review of relevant, extrinsic evidence is appropriate 
only when "reasonably supported by the language of the contract." Dairies v. Vincent, 
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2008 UT 51,1J27. Thus, a claim of ambiguity in contractual language must be "plausible 
and reasonable" in light of the language used. Id. f31. The evidence of intent offered by 
the City could not be considered absent ambiguity in the language of the Trust Deed. 
A trial court may not consider parol evidence of intent without first finding 
ambiguity in the language of a contract. And, while relevant evidence 
proffered to demonstrate the alleged facial ambiguity must be considered, 
our analysis of such evidence is strictly limited to the determination of the 
existence of facial ambiguity and is "ultimately circumscribed by the 
language of the agreement." Set Dairies, 2008 UT 51, P 28, 190 P.3d 1269. 
Flores v. Earnshaw, 2009 UT App 90, 209 P.2d 428, 433. 
The City failed to show any plausible and reasonable interpretation of the Trust Deed that 
would exclude the 160 Acre Feet. It argues, however, that the recital in the Note stating 
that it is secured by the 1125 acre feet creates an ambiguity in the Trust Deed. No 
ambiguity is created by the language of the Note. The Note recited that it was secured by 
Parcel No. 59-019-0001, which by operation of law included all improvements, 
appurtenant water rights, and all other appurtenances. There was no need or reason to 
repeat the description of improvements or appurtenances in the Note. Thus, the Note 
itemized only the non-appurtenant water rights (the 1125 acre feet). There is no conflict 
between the Trust Deed and the Note with respect to the inclusion (in both documents) of 
appurtenant water rights. Since there is no ambiguity in the Trust Deed, the trial court 
properly refused to consider parol evidence of intent contrary to the language of the Trust 
Deed. 
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In addition to the foregoing, the trial court's decision that the Trust Deed conveyed 
the 160 Acre Feet should be affirmed on other grounds. See Jensen ex rel Jensen v. 
Cunningham, 2011 UT 17, ^ 36, 250 P.3d 465 ("We may affirm a grant of summary 
judgment upon any grounds apparent in the record."). Those grounds are that the 
extrinsic evidence upon which the City's argument hangs showed that Lenders had no 
intention of giving up the 160 Acre Feet unless they received a lien on the 1125 acre feet. 
The City relies on testimony of EML's principal, Robert Jones, that Lenders "forewent 
the 160 acre feet and allowed it to release in exchange for the 1,125 acre feet" (City's 
Brief at 12) and the following affidavit testimony of John Strasser, the principal of two of 
the Lenders: 
Mr. Jones later proposed providing other water, which he later 
characterized as 1125 acre feet, to replace the 160 acre feet of water 
appurtenant to or to be used on the land. The Loan Participants were willing 
to make that exchange, 1125 acre feet for 160 acre feet." 
City's Brief at 12-13. This exchange or substitution never occurred because (1) EML 
never pledged the 1,125 acre feet to Lenders or purported to do so and (2) EML never 
had an interest in the 1,125 acre feet that it could have conveyed. Facts 1flfl4, 20, 22. 
Based on those facts, the trial court stated in its Ruling that, u[a]lthough Lenders were 
apparently willing to accept the 1125 acre feet instead of the 160 Acre Feet, they never 
received the 1125 acre feet and thus retained their rights to the 160 Acre Feet." R886. In 
substance, the City argues that Lenders, having been deprived of what they were to 
receive in the exchange, should have been forced by the trial court to disgorge the 160 
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Acre Feet that they would have given up if the exchange had taken place. When the 
proffered extrinsic evidence is considered in the context of relevant facts and 
circumstances, it is clear that (1) Lenders never intended to give up the 160 Acre Feet 
unless they received a lien on the 1125 acre feet and (2) Lenders never received a lien on 
the 1125 acre feet. Thus, such evidence would have been of no help to the City's cause 
even if it could have been considered under the strictures of the parol evidence rule. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE TRUST DEED WAS 
CORRECT AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED ON TWO ALTERNATIVE 
GROUNDS IN ANY EVENT. 
The City further argues that the Trust Deed should be interpreted to exclude the 
160 Acre Feet on the theory that the Land was not being irrigated at the exact moment 
when EML purchased it. City's Brief at 20-21. It relies on the Trust Deed's phrase "water 
rights . . . and appurtenances thereunto belonging, now or hereafter used or enjoyed with 
said property, or any part thereof," contending that the word "now" requires that the 
water have been used "at the time the Trust Deed was recorded." Id. at 20. In so arguing, 
the City makes no attempt to analyze the trial court's Ruling that the City's interpretation 
is "artificial and unreasonably narrow" and that "the 160 Acre Feet were in use 
substantially contemporaneously with the execution of the Trust Deed and were therefore 
included within the granting clause." R888-89. The evidence clearly showed that the 
Land had been irrigated using the 160 Acre Feet for ten consecutive years prior to the 
sale, that the irrigation season ran from April to October of each year and that EML's 
purchase of the Land was closed on May 25, 2007, early in the 2007 irrigation season. 
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Facts ffljl, 8-9. The City offers no rationale or authority for the proposition that the 
Ruling was incorrect. 
The trial court's Ruling on this point should be affirmed on two alternative 
grounds. First, Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-11(1) renders the 160 Acre Feet appurtenant to the 
Land for purposes of the conveyance effected by the Trust Deed, whether or not it made 
any mention of water rights. Thus, even if the City's interpretation were correct, it would 
make no difference in the result because the 160 Acre Feet were included by operation of 
law. This conclusion is consistent with paragraph 20 of the Trust Deed, mandating that 
the instrument be "construed according to the laws of Utah." Hence, the provisions of 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-11 must be given full effect, including their clear and precise 
definition of what water rights are appurtenant "for purposes of land conveyances only." 
That definition includes water rights evidenced by a certificate of appropriation and water 
rights evidenced by an approval for a permanent change application. Id. 73-1-1 l(5)(b)(ii) 
and (vi). The 160 Acre Feet are evidenced by both such a certificate and such an 
approval. Facts ^ 8 , 10. 
Second, Lenders submit that the elements of the phrase "thereunto belonging, now 
or hereafter used or enjoyed with said property" are disjunctive, or alternative, with the 
broadest application possible, for the benefit of the Lenders. Thus, for example, water 
rights would include those "thereunto belonging," or "now or hereafter used," or 
"enjoyed with said property." See, Doctors' Co. v. Drezga, 2009 UT 60, % 11, 218 P.3d 
598 (Utah 2009) ("the contract uses clearly disjunctive language, indicating that TDC can 
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either rescind or cancel the policy, but cannot do both."); In re AM, 2009 UT App 118, J^ 
14, 208 P.3d 1058; Home Sav. and Loan v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 817 P.2d 341, 358 
(Utah App. 1991); Berger v. Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co., 723 P.2d 388, 390 (Utah 
1986). Since the 160 Acre Feet, as appurtenant water rights, clearly fit within the term 
"thereunto belonging," they are included as appurtenances to the Land based on that 
phrase alone without regard to the alternative of being "now or hereafter used or enjoyed 
with said property." 
IV, UTAH CODE § 73-l-ll(5)(e) SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED IN A 
MANNER THAT PRODUCES ABSURD RESULTS. 
A further argument made by the City is that Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-1 l(5)(e) 
reduces the extent of water rights conveyed by the Trust Deed to 126.4 acre feet because 
the entire "authorized place of use" for the 160 Acre Feet was not conveyed by the Trust 
Deed. The City thus argues that the remaining 33.6 acre feet were not encumbered by the 
Trust Deed and passed from EML to Circle of Builders to the City free and clear. This 
argument raises an issue of statutory construction. 
The legislature appears to have enacted Section 73-1-11 in order to provide a set 
of default rules governing the circumstances under which, and the extent to which, water 
rights pass as part of a conveyance of land where the parties to the conveyance have 
failed to address those issues specifically in their instruments of conveyance. Subsection 
(1) establishes the general rule that appurtenant water rights pass to the grantee unless 
one of three exceptions applies. Subsection (2) identifies which grantee obtains the water 
17 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
right if it has been used to irrigate multiple parcels (where all parcels are not conveyed to 
the same grantee). Subsection (3) allocates responsibility for unpaid water assessments. 
Subsection (4) excludes shares of stock in irrigation companies from the workings of the 
statute. Subsection (5)(b) defines which water rights are appurtenant. Subsection (5)(c) 
provides a rule for identifying the land to which a water right is appurtenant. Subsection 
(5)(d) presumes that, where part of a water right is expressly conveyed by a document, 
the remainder of the water right is reserved by the grantor. Finally, subsection (5)(e) deals 
with conveyances of only part of the "authorized place of use" for a water right by 
providing that the water right passes in proportion to the conveyed portion of the 
authorized place of use. Overall, the legislature must have concluded that the statute 
would accomplish what most parties to land conveyances would probably choose to do if 
they were to make a conscious decision. 
Focusing specifically on subsection (5)(e), let us assume that a person owning 160 
acres of land and 160 acre feet of appurtenant water rights conveys 40 acres of land to 
one buyer and 120 acres to another, without specifying what happens to the water rights. 
Rough justice is afforded by the statutory default rule allocating 40 acre feet of water 
rights to the first buyer and 120 acre feet to the other. 
However, where a landowner owns only a portion of the entire authorized place of 
use, but conveys all that it owns thereof, the statute leads to absurd results. Let us assume 
that the authorized place of use is 200 acres and that grantor A conveys 160 acre feet of 
water rights to B by separate deed (removing that transfer from the statute's reach) and 
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158 acres of the authorized place of use to B. Since the statute does not control the 
amount of water conveyed, grantee B receives 160 acre feet of water. The authorized 
place of use, as per the certificate on file with the State Engineer, remains 200 acres. 
Then, grantor B conveys the 158 acres to C, making no mention of water rights. By literal 
application of subsection (5)(e), Grantee C receives only 126.4 acre feet of water, and B 
inadvertently retains 33.6 acre feet. As a grantor, C then conveys the land to D, making 
no mention of water rights. By literal application of subsection (5)(e), Grantee D receives 
only 101.12 acre feet of water, and C inadvertently retains 25.28 acre feet. At the end of 
the day, D owns 158 acres, but has only 101.12 acre feet of water. The remainder of the 
water right originally conveyed by A still remains in the unknowing hands of B and C, 
who have no ownership interest in any part of the authorized place of use. 
A statute should not be construed or applied in a manner that produces absurd 
results. State ex rel Z.C., 2007 UT 54, «|11, 165 P.3d 1206, 1209. What the legislature 
most likely intended was that the phrase "authorized place of use" in subsection (5)(e) 
meant only that portion of the authorized place of use owned by the grantor. This 
interpretation avoids absurd and anomalous results and is consistent with the apparent 
intent of the legislature. Applied here, that interpretation would result in the entire 160 
acre feet of water rights acquired by EML being included in its conveyance of the Land 
by way of the Trust Deed. That would be a far more logical and reasonable outcome than 
the alternative of chopping up the water right and leaving parts of it strewn about in the 
unknowing hands of a party who (after foreclosure) owns no land. 
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V. IN VIEW OF THE AVOIDED FRAUDULENT TRANSFER, THE CITY 
WOULD NOT BENEFIT FROM RELIANCE ON UTAH CODE § 73-1-
ll(5)(e). 
The Judgment granted Lenders relief under the Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act in 
the alternative, avoiding EML's transfer of the 160 Acre Feet to Circle of Builders as 
fraudulent. So long as such alternative relief remains in force, the City's argument based 
on Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-1 l(5)(e) seeks only an advisory opinion and could not change 
the outcome of this appeal. The City assumes in its argument that, if 33.6 acre feet of the 
160 Acre Feet are excluded from the Trust Deed by virtue of Section § 73-1-1 l(5)(e)? the 
City will emerge the owner of 33.6 acre feet. In reality, however, EML's transfer of those 
33.6 acre feet to Circle of Builders has been alternatively set aside as fraudulent, leaving 
the City with no right, title or interest therein. The Utah County Sheriff has sold those 
water rights at an execution sale pursuant to express authorization granted in the 
Judgment, which provides that "[t]he sale of the Water Right Entitlements conducted by 
the Sheriff in accordance with this Judgment shall be deemed, in the alternative, to be a 
valid execution sale of such Water Right Entitlements." R912. 
VI. SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE FRAUDULENT TRANSFER CLAIM 
SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
EML transferred the 160 Acre Feet to its sister company, Circle of Builders, on 
June 22, 2007, without receiving any consideration in return. Facts T|13. The 160 Acre 
Feet had a value at that time of $1,920,000. R703. Further, EML's liabilities exceeded the 
value of its remaining assets by more than $2.2 million immediately after the transfer. 
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Facts ffi[14-18. N o n e of these facts was disputed. R735-37; R895. Based on these facts, 
the trial court concluded that "Lenders have established all of the statutory requirements 
[under Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-6] for avoidance of EML's transfer of the 160 Acre Feet 
to Circle of Builders as a fraudulent transfer." Ruling at 11, R886. The City 
acknowledges that "the only fraudulent transfer was the transfer from Eagle Mountain 
Lots to Circle of Builders." City's Brief at 23. 
Nevertheless, the City discusses a different transfer, contending that the 
subsequent transfer of the 160 Acre Feet from Circle of Builders to the City could not be 
avoided because the City "was a good faith transferee" and "provided reasonably 
equivalent value in the form of banked entitlements." City's Brief at 22. Lenders did not 
seek avoidance of the subsequent transfer, nor did they need to do so. Utah Code Ann. § 
25-6-8(1) provides: 
(1) in an action for relief against a transfer or obligation under this chapter, 
a creditor, subject to the limitations in Section 25-6-9, may obtain: 
(a) avoidance of the transfer or obligation to the extent necessary to 
satisfy the creditor's claim . . . . 
Section 25-6-9(1) provides protection for certain subsequent transferees by providing that 
transfers are "not voidable under Subsection 25-6-5(1 )(a) against a person who took in 
good faith and for a reasonably equivalent value or against any subsequent transferee." 
Neither Lenders nor the trial court relied on Subsection 25-6-5(1). The trial court granted 
relief solely under Subsection 25-6-6. 
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Once a transfer has been ruled void, any subsequent transfer of the same asset is 
likewise void except as otherwise provided by Utah's Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. 
The primary authority on which the City relies for the proposition that the transfer of 
water rights should not be voided as against the City is Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-8(4), 
providing that a "good-faith transferee" is entitled to "a lien on or a right to retain any 
interest in the asset transferred" to the extent of the "value given the debtor for the 
transfer." This statute gives rise to an affirmative defense (right to retain the asset upon 
showing that value was given to the debtor) and/or the right to assert a counterclaim 
(imposition of a lien on the asset to the extent of value shown to have been given the 
debtor). See New Jersey Dept. of Environmental Protection v. Caldeira, 768 A.2d 782, 
793 (N.J. Super.A.D. 2001), reversed on other grounds, 794 A.2d 156 (N.J. 2002) ("the 
burden is on the transferee to demonstrate this affirmative defense" that the transferee 
took in good faith and for value,); In re Agricultural Research and Technology Group, 
Inc., 916 F.2d 528, 535 (9th Cir. 1990) (under Hawaii's Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 
transferee bears burden of proof to establish receipt of transfer in good faith). 
The trial court rejected the City's good-faith-transferee-for-value theory on the 
grounds that the City (1) "did not assert it as a defense in its Answer," (2) "presented no 
evidence that it gave value for the water rights transferred to it by Circle of Builders or 
that it was an innocent purchaser," (3) submitted no admissible evidence as to the 
amount of the value it claimed to have given and (4) failed to show that value was "given 
to the debtor^ Ruling at 10-11, R886-87. In its Brief, the City makes virtually no attempt 
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to show error in any of these independently sufficient grounds cited by the trial court for 
rejecting the City's good faith transferee defense.1 
The City does argue, however, that the trial court's conclusion that Lenders could 
foreclose "banked entitlements" required a finding that the City "provided value in the 
form of banked entitlement in exchange for the 160 Acre Feet." City's Brief at 24. There 
was no evidence before the trial court supporting the City's contention that it credited 
Circle of Builders with "banked entitlements" in exchange for the 160 Acre Feet. Further, 
there was no evidence before the trial court as to the character or nature of "banked 
entitlements" or their value. In its pleadings and argument, the City led the trial court 
(and Lenders) to believe that the "banked entitlements" were in substance the 160 Acre 
Feet of water rights, albeit converted to different points of diversion and restricted to 
municipal use by virtue of a change application filed with the State Engineer, R352-55, 
resulting in the City holding legal title and the owner of the "banked water right" holding 
equitable title. 
First, in its Answer, the City alleged that (1) Lenders released a portion of the 
"Water Rights"2 in which Property Reserve, Inc. "claims the beneficial right" and (2) 
Lenders consented to the transfer of the "Water Rights" to the City "and are at most 
1
 The City also cites Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-9(2), which does not apply because Lenders 
did not seek a money judgment for the value of the water rights. In any event, the City 
did not plead this defense and did not bear its burden of proving that it acted in good faith 
and gave value. 
2
 Although the City did not define this term, it appears based on the context in which it 
was used to have had reference to the 160 Acre Feet. 
23 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
entitled to the equitable interest in the remaining banked portion of the Water Rights held 
by Eagle Mountain." City's Answer at 2fl[13), R182, and 5 (Ninth Defense), R179. 
Second, in its argument to the Court, the following statements by the City's 
counsel characterized the nature of the water right as it existed after the City converted it 
to a municipal water right: 
It [the 160 Acre Feet] was the water [that] was owned by Circle of 
Builders. Circle of Builders came to the City and said, "We have this water 
right. We have some developments on the horizon. We'd like to get this 
water right to the City." The City went through the process of changing it to 
a municipal water right, and changing it into the name of Eagle Mountain 
City, and then allowed Circle of Builders to have 160 acre feet of banked 
water right. 
Transcript, Dec. 17, 2010, R964, at 23:23-25 through 24:1-5. The City's counsel used the 
term "banked water right" or "banked water rights" at least seven times3 in referring to 
the water rights to which the City holds legal title, essentially as nominee4 for the 
equitable owners to whom Circle of Builders assigned the rights. Thus, the City used the 
terms "banked entitlements" and "banked water rights" as synonymous. It described the 
process the City went through as that of "changing" the 160 Acre Feet to "a municipal 
water right."5 
3Transcript, Dec. 17, 2010, R964, at 23:20, 24:5-6, 31:20-21, 59:23-24, 60:2. 
4
 Lenders asserted that Defendants Richards and Gyuro "may claim that the City holds a 
portion of the Water Right as nominees for those Defendants." Memo, in Supp. of 
Motion for Summary Judgment, ^|14, R621. The City did not dispute this. 
5
 In fairness, the City's counsel also argued that the City gave back to developers "a water 
right credit against development," Transcript, R964, at 23:19-21, but typically described 
what the City "gave" as "banked water rights." Id. at 31:19-21; 59:23-24. 
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In light of (1) the absence of evidence and (2) the City's characterization of the 
water right as described above, the trial court could not make a finding that the City gave 
"banked entitlements" in exchange for the 160 Acre Feet. Even if such a finding could 
have been made, the City did not plead the affirmative defense that it gave value in good 
faith and the record remains devoid of evidence to establish good faith, the amount of 
value given or that the City gave value to the debtor, EML, as the statute requires. 
VII. THE PROVISION OF THE JUDGMENT DIRECTING THE SHERIFF TO 
SELL THE WATER RIGHT ENTITLEMENTS SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
Lastly, the City takes exception to the provision of the Judgment directing the 
Utah County Sheriff to sell the Water Right Entitlements (i.e., the remaining unreleased 
banked entitlements of the 160 Acre Feet) at public auction. R912-13.6 The City failed to 
preserve this issue by raising it in the trial court, despite having had multiple 
opportunities to do so. In addition, the record contains no evidence from which it can be 
determined that the Water Right Entitlements are materially different in substance from 
the equitable ownership interest in the remaining part of the 160 Acre Feet. Moreover, if 
there was an error made, the City invited the error by its own pleadings and arguments. 
Finally, the City's arguments on this score are contradictory, and the City has not shown 
that it would benefit in any way from the relief it appears to seek—namely a decision of 
6
 The Land and such Water Right Entitlements were sold at public auction to Lenders by 
the Utah County Sheriff on May 11, 2011. Certificate of Sale of Real Estate dated May 
20, 2011 (in file 4 containing record on appeal). 
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this Court order requiring the trial court to set aside the Sheriffs sale of the Water Right 
Entitlements and to order that the remainder of the 160 Acre Feet be sold instead. 
Preservation. The City had four opportunities to advise the trial court of its view 
that the decree of foreclosure should have directed the sale of the 160 Acre Feet (or 
106.72 acre feet thereof) rather than the equitable interests therein held by the City and 
Defendants Royal Richards and Homespin, LLC. The first arose when Lenders served 
their proposed Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying 
Eagle Mountain City's and Royal Richards' Motions for Summary Judgment (Addendum 
l)7 on January 4, 2011. It contained on page 21 thereof the following language: 
The Court will issue a judgment and decree of foreclosure consistent 
with the foregoing Order determining that the Trust Deed is prior and 
superior to the interests of all Defendants with respect to the Land and the 
remaining banked entitlements (106.72 acre feet) of the 160 Acre Feet that 
Lenders have not heretofore released and directing the Sheriff of Utah 
County to sell the Land and such banked entitlements. 
The second opportunity arose when the trial court issued its Ruling on February 14, 2011, 
containing the above-quoted language verbatim. R885. The third opportunity for the City 
to raise this issue came when Lenders served the proposed Judgment and Decree of 
Foreclosure on the City's counsel on February 23, 2011. R911. Finally, after entry of the 
Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure on March 9, 2011, Lenders served a Notice of Entry 
of Judgment with a copy of the Judgment attached thereto on the City's counsel on 
7
 This proposed Order was not found in the trial court's file constituting the record on 
appeal. A true and correct copy of such Order showing the trial court's filing stamp and 
service on counsel for the City on January 4, 2011, is included in the Addendum. 
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March 16, 2011. R916-25. Within ten days (i.e., two weeks) after March 95 the City could 
have brought the issue to the attention of the trial court by filing a motion under Utah R. 
Civ. P. 59 to alter or amend the Judgment. Having failed to raise this issue below, the 
City should not be heard to complain about it on appeal. Searle v. Searle, 2001 UT App 
367, |^ 17, 38 P.3d 307 ("[t]o preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must first 
raise the issue in the trial court, giving that court an opportunity to rule on the issue."). 
Lack of Evidence Showing that Banked Entitlements Were Materially Different 
from the 160 Acre Feet. As discussed at pages 22-24 above, the City never provided the 
trial court any evidence as to the nature of character of the "banked entitlements." Absent 
such evidence, the trial court was justified in regarding the banked entitlements as 
synonymous with other terms used by the City, such as "banked water rights," "beneficial 
right" and "equitable interest" in the 160 Acre Feet. Where the City had obtained 
regulatory approval changing the point of diversion, place of use and nature of use of the 
160 Acre Feet, thereby restricting its use to municipal purposes within the City's 
boundaries, the banked entitlements appeared to represent the equitable ownership of and 
the right to make beneficial use of the 160 Acre Feet. Absent evidence showing that such 
appearance was incorrect, this Court is unable to determine that the banked entitlements 
were materially different from the 160 Acre Feet in the form in which they existed at the 
time of the Judgment. 
Invited Error. If the trial court erred in ordering the Sheriff to sell Water Right 
Entitlements rather than 106.72 acre feet of the 160 Acre Feet, it was an error invited by 
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the City. As explained above, the City led the Lenders and the trial court to believe that 
the banked entitlements were in substance the same as "banked water rights," "beneficial 
right" and "equitable interest" in the 160 Acre Feet. Having invited the error, the City 
cannot complain thereof on appeal. Kramer v. State Retirement Bd,, 2008 UT App 351, 
[^27, n. 11, 195 P.3d 925, 932 ("A party who either leads another to commit an error or by 
its conduct approves the error committed by another, cannot later take advantage of such 
error on appeal."). Further, the City argues that "Plaintiffs are only entitled to a claim 
against Circle of Builders and other defendants' interest in the banked entitlements." 
City's Brief at 24. Given that statement, the City is hard pressed to explain why the 
Judgment should not have directed the Sheriff to sell the banked entitlements, not only of 
the other defendants, but of the City as well. There was no basis in the evidence for 
treating the City differently from the other defendants. 
Absence of Meaningful Relief that Could Be Afforded the City. The goal of the 
City's argument that the Judgment should not have ordered the sale of banked 
entitlements seems to be to obtain an order of this Court requiring the trial court to set 
aside the Sheriffs sale of the Water Right Entitlements and to order that the remaining 
106.72 acre feet of the 160 Acre Feet be sold instead. Should that occur, the City would 
be divested of the same rights, benefits and interests that it lost through the Sheriffs sale 
of the Water Right Entitlements. For this reason alone, the Court should deny relief. It 
would be a pointless exercise in technicality benefiting none but imposing needless delay, 
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burdens and expenses on Lenders, as well as consuming resources of the trial court and 
the Sheriff. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
In light of the foregoing, the Court should affirm the Judgment in all respects. 
DATED this 17th day of October, 2011. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
A Professional Corporation 
By:. A 
James C. Swindler 
Wayne G. Petty 
Attorney for Appellees 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 17 day of October, 2011,1 served two copies of the 
foregoing by mail to the following: 
Gerald H. Kinghorn 
Jeremy R. Cook 
Parsons Kinghorn Harris 
111 East Broadway, 11 Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
/ 
a 
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ADDENDUM TO BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
1. [Proposed] Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Denying Eagle Mountain City's and Royal Richards' Motions for Summary 
Judgment 
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Wayne G. Petty (#2596) 
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C. 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
175 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-0250 
Email: wavne@moylelawfinTi.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
James C. Swindler (#3177) 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
175 E. 400 S., Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 524-1000 
Facsimile: (801) 524-1099 
Email: ics@princeyeates.com 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RUTH B. HARDY REVOCABLE TRUST, 
DELCON CORPORATION PROFIT SHARING 
PLAN FBO A. WESLEY HARDY AKA DELCON 
CORP. PSP FBO A, W. HARDY, FINESSE 
P.S.P., MJS REAL PROPERTIES LLC AKA 
MJS REALPROPERTIES, UINTAH 
INVESTMENTS, LLC AKA UINTAH 
INVESTMENTS, DAVID D. SMITH, STEVEN 
CONDLE, DAVID L. JOHNSON, BERRETT PSP, 
VW PROFESSIONAL HOMES PSP, TY 
THOMAS, AND D.R.P. MANAGEMENT PSP, 
Plaintiffs 
vs. 
EAGLE MOUNTAIN LOTS, L.L.C AKA 
EAGLE MOUNTAIN LOTS, LLC, GRANT 
BYBEE, BB&S, LLC, ROBERT A. JONES DBA 
BB&S, LLC, THE CIRCLE OF BUILDERS, 
L.L.C, ROYAL RICHARDS, HOMESPIN, 
LLC, EAGLE MOUNTAIN CITY AND JOHN 
DOES I X 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING 
EAGLE MOUNTAIN CITY'S AND ROYAL 
RICHARDS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Case No. 090401015 LM 
Judge Hansen 
Defendants 
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On December 17,2010, the Court heard oral argument on (1) Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, (2) Eagle Mountain City's Motion for Summary Judgment with Respect to Water Rights 
and (3) Defendant Royal Richards' Joinder Motion for Summary Judgment to Defendant Eagle 
Mountain City's Motion for Summary Judgment with Respect to Water Rights, with James C. 
Swindler and Wayne G. Petty appearing for Plaintiffs ("Lenders"), Jeremy R. Cook appearing for 
Eagle Mountain City ("City") and Matt C Osborne appearing for Royal Richards ("Richards"). The 
Court took the above-described motions ("Motions") under advisement. In their respective Motions, 
all parties contend that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that judgment should be entered 
as a matter of law. They disagree primarily as to whether certain facts have evidentiary support and 
as to the correct application of law to the undisputed facts. Based upon the papers on file and upon 
the arguments of counsel, the Court grants Lenders' Motion and denies the Motions of the City and 
Richards. Eagle Mountain Lots, L.L.C. is hereinafter referred to as "EML." 
Summary of Court's Decision 
i. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-11, the Water Right (160 Acre Feet described 
below) was included in the conveyance of the Land effected by the Trust Deed. 
ii. The City and Richards rely on a claimed oral agreement between EML and Lenders 
to exclude the Water Right from the Loan collateral in contradiction of the Trust Deed.1 Such an oral 
agreement may not be enforced by the City or Richards for the following reasons: (a) Section 73-1-
11 makes no exception for such an agreement; (b) the parol evidence rule precludes enforcement of 
1
 The claimed agreement is that Lenders agreed to accept 1125 acre feet of Jordan River 
water rights as collateral in lieu of the 160 Acre Feet. 
_1_ 
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the claimed oral agreement, as the Trust Deed is not ambiguous; (c) the claimed oral agreement is 
void per Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1; and (d) alternatively, the City and Richards are not parties to or 
third-party beneficiaries of the claimed oral agreement and lack standing to enforce it. 
iii. The material facts supported by admissible evidence are not in dispute; 
iv. The Note is in default and there is no dispute as to the amount owing thereunder; 
v. The Note is secured by the Trust Deed, which is a valid lien on the Land and 160 Acre 
Feet (except for those portions heretofore released by Lenders); and 
vi. Alternatively, EML's transfer of the 160 Acre Feet to The Circle of Builders, L.L.C. 
was a fraudulent transfer avoidable pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-6. 
Based upon the conclusions summarized above and as further explained below, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 
1. The pleadings, affidavits and papers submitted to the Court do not raise a genuine 
issue of material fact. First, the Court determines that there is no dispute as to any of the facts set 
forth in Lenders' Statement, in Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, of Facts as to Which 
No Genuine Issue Exists (the "Lenders' Statement of Facts"), which is quoted below in italics, 
followed by a discussion in standard typeface of those paragraphs contested by the City or Richards.2 
$3.3 Million Loan and Loan Documents 
^ |1 - Lenders made the [$3.3 million] Loan to Eagle Mountain Lots, L.L. C. ("EML ") in May 
2007. 
2
 The Court notes that Richards expressly admitted the facts stated in the following 
paragraphs of Lenders' Statement of Facts for purposes of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment: %% 1-10, 12-16, 24-25, 29-30. The City disputed none of Lenders' Statement of Facts. 
-2-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
\2- The Loan is evidenced by a Promissory Note (the "Note ") executed by Robert A. Jones 
and Hartley Curtis, as Managers ofEML. 
1(3- The Note is secured by a Trust Deed executed by Robert A. Jones and Bartley Curtis, as 
Manager or Managers on behalf of EML. The Trust Deed was recorded in the office of the County 
Recorder for Utah County on May 31, 2007, as Entry No. 80022:2007. 
1(4- The legal description in the Trust Deed contained minor errors, which were corrected 
by means of an Affidavit of Correction to Recorded Document Such Affidavit was recorded in the 
office of the County Recorder for Utah County on May 8, 2008, as Entry No. 54512:2008. 
1(5- Sutherland Title Company received $3,300,000 from the Lenders representing the 
amount of the Loan. 
1(6- Justin Sutherland prepared a Disbursement Worksheet in connection with the 
transaction. A copy is attached as Exhibit G to the Sutherland Affidavit. 
\I-Justin Sutherland disbursed the amount of $3,300,000 in the manner reflected in the 
Disbursement Worksheet. 
Extension of Loan Maturity and Eventual Default by EML Under the Note 
1(8- EML paid an extension fee to Lenders in January 2008, whereby the maturity date of the 
Note was extended to May 18, 2008. 
1(9- EML is in default under the Note in that, among other things, it has failed to pay interest 
due on February 18, 2008, and thereafter and has failed to pay any part of the indebtedness owing 
under the Note when it came due on May 18, 2008 or at any time thereafter. 
1(10- The entire balance owing under the Note came due on May 18, 2008, and has not been 
paid. 
Balance Owing on the Loan 
1(11- Under the terms of the Note, EML is indebted to Lenders in the amount of $6,666,000 
as of August 18, 2010, plus $2,169.86 per day thereafter, Lenders' attorney fees and costs incurred 
in connection with this action; interest on the principal balance has been accruing at $66,000 per 
month from and after July 18, 2009, together with a 1% per month finance charge accruing at 
$33,000 per month. 
Discussion: As to this paragraph, Richards raises the purely legal issue that any deficiency 
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judgment is limited by Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32. Inasmuch as this is a judicial foreclosure, §57-1-
32 has no application to this case. 
Priority of Trust Deed Over Interests Claimed by Defendants 
^[12- Defendants BB&S, LLC, Grant Bybee, and Robert A. Jones dba BB&S, LLC claim or 
may claim an interest in the Property under and by virtue of a document entitled Declaration of 
Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions recorded in the office of the County Recorder for Utah 
County on September 25, 2008, as Entry No. 105644:2008. These Defendants were properly served, 
failed to answer the complaint, and their defaults have been entered, as reflected in the Court *sfiles. 
TJ13— The City claims an interest in Water Right Number 54-1225 (a33129) (the u Water 
Right") or water associated with said Water Right by virtue of a conveyance it received from Circle 
of Builders on or about August 30, 2007. 
^[14- Defendants Royal Richards and Steven T Gyuro, aka Tom Gyuro (i(Gyuro "),3 claim 
or may claim an interest in a portion of the Water Right associated with or related to the conveyance 
of the Water Right by Circle of Builders to the City, or claim or may claim that the City holds a 
portion of the Water Right as nominee for those Defendants. 
^{15- The following documents regarding the Land and Water Rights were recorded in the 
office of the Utah County Recorder on the respective dates indicated next to each document and 
were assigned the respect entry numbers indicated next to each document, as follows: 
| DOCUMENT 
Warranty Deed [Berrys to 
Eagle Mountain Lots LLC] 
Trust Deed [Eagle Mountain 
Lots, LLC to "Lenders " ] 
Water Right Deed and 
Assignment [W. Glade Berry 
1 to EML] 
RECORDING DATE 
May 25, 2007 ' 
May 31, 2007 
j May 25, 2007 
ENTRY NUMBER \ 
78095:2007 
80022:2007 
j 78092:2007 
3
 Guyro's interest in the Water Right is held by his company, Homespin, LLC, which was 
substituted in place of Guyro as the real party in interest. Stipulation for Substitution of Parties 
filed March 19, 2010, and Order Substituting Parties entered March 22, 2010. 
-4-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Water Right Deed and 
Assignment [Zane Berry to 
\EMLJ 
Water Right Deed and 
Assignment [Steven Berry to 
\EMLJ 
May 25, 2007 
May 25, 2007 
78093:2007 
78094:2007 
%\6- Defendants EML and Circle of Builders were properly served, failed to answer the 
complaint, and their defaults have been entered, as reflected in the Court's files. 
160 Acre Feet of Water Rights Appurtenant to the Land 
^[17- As of the May 2007 closing of EML's purchase of the Land and 160 Acre Feet, the 
annual period of use of the 160 Acre Feet was from April 1 to October 31. 
% 18- The 160 Acre Feet had been used to irrigate the Land for the previous ten years before 
the May 2007 closing of the Loan. That water right was entitled to be used on a rotating basis to 
irrigate 40 acres (in any given year) of a total area of 200 acres, including the Land. 
\\9- The Division of Water Rights, State of Utah ("Division of Water Rights") issued a 
Certificate of Beneficial Use on March 13, 1995, with respect to the 160 Acre Feet, a certified copy 
of which is included in Exhibit C attached [to Lenders' Memorandum]. That Certificate constitutes 
a certificate of appropriation within the meaning of Utah Code § 73-3-17. 
1J20- On January 27, 1995, pursuant to Utah Code § 73-3-10, the Division of Water Rights 
approved an Application for Permanent Change of Water, a certified copy of which is included in 
Exhibit C attached hereto. Such action constitutes an approval of an application to permanently 
change the place of use of water within the meaning of Utah Code § 73-1-1 l(5)(b)(vi). 
Fraudulent Transfer of Water Rights by EML 
^[21- EML acquired the 160 Acre Feet using proceeds of the Loan. 
1(22- On or about June 22, 2007, EML transferred the 160 Acre Feet to Circle of Builders. 
1f23- EML did not receive anything from Circle of Builders in return for the 160 Acre Feet. 
Discussion: The City does not dispute this fact, but Richards denies it, contending that 
"Circle of Builders entered into an agreement with EML to allow the use of its 1125 acres of water 
-5-
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rights as collateral for the loan in return for the 160 acre feet to be used for other purposes." This 
claim does not have evidentiary support. Richards relies on page 65 of the Jones Deposition, but that 
testimony does not support his claim. He apparently meant to refer to page 66, where Jones testified 
that "there must have been a contract" but then said "[e]ither that or the title company really screwed 
up, huh?" Jones Depo. 66:10-11. Such testimony is not admissible to prove the existence or content 
of an agreement because foundation is lacking and the testimony is mere speculation, Jones gave no 
testimony as to the actual terms of the supposed contract, and the best evidence rule requires that the 
contract itself be offered to prove its terms. More importantly, the record is clear that the 1125 acre 
feet were never transferred to EML. See ^|28, infra. Finally, EML did not purport to convey any 
interest in that water right to Lenders. See Trust Deed. Richards and the City rely on a recital in the 
Note saying that it "is secured by a first mortgage on" the water rights comprising the 1125 acre feet. 
However, Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 provides that "[n]o estate or interest in real property . . . shall 
be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or 
by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering 
or declaring the same." (Emphasis added). Such a recital in a note does not constitute a deed or 
conveyance. 
TJ24- EML was a single asset entity whose purpose was to develop the Land. 
^|25- EML did not undertake any construction work, never sold any lots or homes, had no 
income, and made no profit. 
1(26- Robert A. Jones testified that he did not even know of a bank account of EML. When 
EML received a check from the closing of the Loan, it endorsed the check and deposited it into a 
Circle of Builders bank account; Jones did not recall ever seeing a check written on an EML 
account and conceded that it was possible that EML had no bank account. 
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^[27- EML had no employees. 
[^28— Apart from the Land and 160 Acre Feet of water rights, EML did not own any other 
assets. 
^[29- ,4s of June 22, 2007, the Land (exclusive of water rights conveyed on that date to Circle 
of Builders) had a fair market value of$l, 990,000. 
P O - As of June 22, 2007, EML owed Lenders the entire $3.3 million principal balance of 
the Loan plus interest accrued thereon in the amount of $49,183.38. 
p i - As of June 22, 2007, EML owed Summit 1031 Exchange for the benefit of Weston 
Glade Berry and Zane R. Berry the entire principal amount of $63 7,875 and accrued interest owing 
under a Promissory Note signed by EML in connection with the closing of EML's purchase of the 
Land and 160 Acre Feet. 
1(32- As of June 22, 2007, EML owed Steven Glade Berry the entire principal amount of 
$212,625 and accrued interest owing under a Promissory Note signed by EML in connection with 
the closing of EML's purchase of the Land and 160 Acre Feet. 
2. Second, the Court determines that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to any 
of the facts set forth in the numbered paragraphs contained in "Richards' Additional Statement of 
Undisputed Facts" in the Reply Memorandum in Support of Royal Richards' Motion for Summary 
Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (the "Richards 
Opposition") at 11-13. These paragraphs are quoted in italics below, followed by the Court's 
analysis of each paragraph in standard typeface: 
/. The 160 AF was not being used to secure Plaintiffs' loan. Some water 
rights were being used to secure Plaintiffs' loan, but all parties involved in the 
proceedings knew that the water rights being used to secure the loan were not those 
being acquired in the land transaction (i.e. the 160 AF). Rather, the water rights 
being used to secure Plaintiffs1 loan were separate water rights, and the 160 AF 
were to be sold, and otherwise used, separately. 
-7-
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This largely unsupported4 statement repeatedly employs such vague phrases as "were being used" 
without identifying any specific act, who performed it or the time frame to which each of those 
phrases is intended to refer. The statement is not helpful to the Court. The critical issue is what 
rights were actually conveyed by the Trust Deed. The sources cited by Richards in support of this 
statement discuss pre-closing negotiations. Such preliminary discussions regarding potential loan 
collateral may not be used to contradict the express terms of the Trust Deed and are subject to the 
statute of frauds. Thus, this statement is material, if at all, only to the extent permitted by the parol 
evidence rule. The Court's analysis of that rule and the issues concerning it is set forth below. 
2. Plaintiffs, as lenders, never prepared the proper documents to 
encumber the 1125 AF, but relied on Justin Sutherland of Sutherland Title, Plaintiffs' 
closing company, to ensure proper collateralization of the 1125 AF. 
This statement is not material. It matters not whether the 1125 acre feet were described in the Trust 
Deed because EML did not own those water rights. Further, Richards' counsel asserted in oral 
argument that Sutherland Title was the Lenders' agent only. In fact, there is no evidence before the 
Court that Sutherland Title was exclusively Lenders' agent. 
4
 An incomplete copy of a purported interrogatory answer (without a signature) of one of 
the 12 Lenders in another case is inadmissible hearsay as to all of the other Lenders, to which 
they have objected. That interrogatory answer described the "facts or representations" relied 
upon by one Lender. It does not purport to state what was ultimately agreed upon. Richards also 
relies upon John Strasser's deposition testimony given in another case. Lenders properly 
objected to such testimony as being hearsay. Moreover, at that deposition, Lenders' counsel 
timely objected to the question (p. 51) for lack of foundation, as it called for a legal conclusion. 
The witness was not competent to make legal conclusions. The deposition of Justin Sutherland 
is also inadmissible hearsay, as it was taken in another case. The final source was the Jones 
Deposition taken in this case (although the copy submitted by Richards bears the caption of 
another case). The primary statement therefrom upon which Richards relies is inadmissible 
speculation by Jones about what the Lenders "cared about." 
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3. It was always understood that the 160 AF would be used by EML 
separately, and has in fact been used separately in favor of Richards and the City for 
good and valuable consideration. 
This statement is not helpful to the Court.5 "[I]t was always understood" does not establish who had 
the understanding or when. More importantly, any use thereof to alter the express language of the 
Trust Deed is precluded by the parol evidence rule. See discussion of parol evidence rule below. The 
alleged oral agreement is also barred by the statute of frauds, as discussed below. 
4. Plaintiffs understood the value of the 1125 AF to be valued at $20,000 
per acre foot at the time of the transaction. 
This statement is not material because Lenders never received the 1125 acre feet, and EML never 
owned it. Further, it lacks admissible evidentiary support.6 
5. The 1125 AF was encumbered at the time of the loan transaction, 
which Plaintiffs knew. 
This statement is not material in that Lenders never received the 1125 acre feet, and EML never 
owned it. 
5
 The only source offered for this statement is two conclusory, ambiguous passages of the 
Jones Deposition which are not admissible for lack of foundation. Jones never identifies any 
actor or speaker, but refers to all 12 Lenders collectively by pronouns such as "they" and "them," 
never identifying a speaker, time, place or context. 
6
 The Strasser deposition testimony from another case is inadmissible hearsay as used in 
this case. It lacks foundation, being based entirely on hearsay. Neither did Strasser say anything 
resembling this statement. He did not testify as to the value of the 1125 acre feet, but only the 
value of water rights "for residential hookups" in Eagle Mountain. The Jones testimony cited for 
this statement is not admissible in view of the question asked ("What was the perceived value of 
the 1,125 acres?") and the objection interposed ("Objection. Vague as to whose perception 
you're talking about."). Jones was not qualified to give expert opinion testimony and in fact did 
not give an opinion as to the value of the Jordan River water. 
-9-
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6 The 1125 AF had an equity-value in May 2007 of at least $8,850,000; 
more than enough to secure Plaintiffs' $3.3 million loan. 
This statement is irrelevant because Lenders never received the 1125 acre feet, and EML never 
owned it. Further, it relies on paragraph 4's unsupported value conclusion. 
7. Plaintiffs never demanded delivery of the 1125 AFeven after the loan 
defaulted. 
This unsupported statement is irrelevant. EML never owned the 1125 acre feet and could not deliver 
it. By the time the loan became delinquent, the 1125 acre feet had been transferred by Circle of 
Builders to Mark and Brenda Rindlesbach. Jones Depo. Exh. 7. 
8. The Circle of Builders, LLC ("COB") acquired the 1125 AF from 
John Jacob under a Water Purchase Agreement on December 23, 2006. 
This statement is not material. 
9. EML and COB operated under an agreement and understanding, in 
association with the acquisition of the Land and Plaintiffs' loan, that EML would 
transfer the 160 AF to COB, to be used for Jones' "other purposes" in exchange for 
COB's transfer of the 1125 AF to EML. 
This statement is substantially the same as that offered by Richards to dispute |^23 of Lenders' 
Statement of Facts. The Court's discussion above regarding [^23 applies equally to this statement. 
10. EML did have rights in the 1125 AF because EML did in fact perform 
under its agreement with COB and transferred the 160 AF to COB by Water Right 
Deed and Assignment dated June 22, 2001 and filed for record on June 22, 2007 with 
the Utah County Recorder's Office as Entry No. 91288:2007. 
Lenders agree that EML transferred the 160 AF to Circle of Builders by Water Right Deed and 
Assignment dated June 22,2007. The rest of this statement has no evidentiary support. EML never 
owned the 1125 acre feet. It is of no help to the Court to claim that EML performed an agreement 
with Circle of Builders, when no such agreement is in evidence. 
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/ /. That the 1125 AFwere used to secure Plaintiffs' loan was understood 
and carried on by the entities and their members, as exhibited by the Agreement 
buying out Mark and Brenda Rindlesbach 's ("Rindlesbach ") interest in the Robert 
Jones entities, and simultaneously transferring EML's rights under the Water 
Purchase Agreement, including the 1125 AF, to Rindlesbach. 
This statement has no evidentiary basis. The only support offered is Exhibit 7, evidencing Circle 
of Builders' assignment of its water contract with John Jacob to Rindlesbach. EML had no rights 
under the Water Purchase Agreement as it was not a party to it. There is no support for the assertion 
that the 1125 acre feet were "used" to secure Lenders' loan because only a document of conveyance 
signed by the owner of the 1125 acre feet, effectively granting Lenders a lien thereon, could secure 
the loan. No such document has been shown to exist. 
12. In the Agreement, dated December 5, 2007, Robert Jones and the 
Jones entities, including EML and COB, warranted that no encumbrance existed as 
to the water rights transferred, except the encumbrance created in favor of Plaintiffs 
as to the 1125 AF. 
This statement mischaracterizes the written agreement, which speaks for itself. First, no warranty 
is made by EML in it. Second, the warranty on which Richards relies states only that Jones and 
Circle of Builders warrant that Circle of Builders has not assigned or encumbered its rights in the 
water agreement or the 1125 acre feet, "with the sole exception of any encumbrance created by [the 
Trust Deed and the Note]" (emphasis added). This does not establish that the Trust Deed actually 
created an encumbrance on the water agreement or the 1125 acre feet, but only that, if it did, there 
was no warranty against it. It is undisputed that EML never owned the 1125 acre feet or the water 
agreement relating to it. 
3. Third, the Court determines that there is no dispute as to any of the following facts 
set forth in the "Statement of Additional Material Facts" (Lenders' initial Memorandum) pertaining 
-11-
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to the City's Motion and Richards' Motion: 
1|1 - Lenders were unwilling to make the Loan to EML unless they received a security 
interest in substantial water rights in addition to the Land. 
%?> - EML never owned any interest in and never conveyed any security interest in the 1,125 
acre feet of water to Lenders. 
[^4 - In a prior settlement Lenders released their interest in a total of 53.28 acre feet of the 
160 Acre Feet to the following: 
Michael Moss 48.28 acre feet 
Michelle Turpin 3.00 acre feet 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints 2.00 acre feet 
Lenders claim a perfected security interest, by virtue of the Trust Deed, in the remaining 106.72 acre 
feet of the original 160 Acre Feet water right. 
Legal Issues 
4. Undisputed Legal Determinations. There being no dispute on the following points, 
the Court determines that: 
(a) the Note and Trust Deed are valid and enforceable according to their terms; 
(b) EML is in default thereunder; 
(c) the amount owing to Lenders under the Note and secured by the Trust Deed as of August 
18,2010, is $6,666,000, with interest accruing thereafter at $2,169.86 per day after August 18,2010, 
for which total amount Lenders are entitled to judgment against EML; 
(d) Lenders are entitled to an award of their reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in 
this action as against EML7 and the inclusion of such fees and costs in the judgment against EML. 
7
 Lenders have not requested an award of attorney fees against the City or Richards in this 
action. 
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(e) The Trust Deed constitutes a valid security interest in the Land described therein, and 
such Trust Deed is prior to any and all claims, right, title, or interest of Defendants and of all persons 
claiming by, through or under any of Defendants, and Lenders are entitled to a decree of foreclosure 
as to the Land. 
5. Effect of Utah Code Ann. §73-1-11. Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-11 provides in pertinent 
part as follows: 
(1) A water right appurtenant to land shall pass to the grantee of the land 
unless the grantor: 
(a) specifically reserves the water right or any part of the water right in the 
land conveyance document; 
(b) conveys a part of the water right in the land conveyance document; or 
(c) conveys the water right in a separate conveyance document prior to or 
contemporaneously with the execution of the land conveyance document. 
The land conveyance at the heart of this matter is the Trust Deed from EML (grantor) to Lenders 
(grantee). The general rule established by Section 73-1 -11 is that appurtenant water rights pass with 
the land conveyance. None of the three above-quoted exceptions to the general rule applies. First, 
the Trust Deed contains no reservation of any water rights. Second, the Trust Deed does not purport 
to convey only a part of the 160 Acre Feet. Third, the grantor, EML, did not convey the 160 Acre 
Feet in a separate conveyance document prior to or contemporaneously with the Trust Deed. 
As to the last point above, the City and Richards argue that previous grantors in the chain of 
title, members of the Berry family, conveyed the 160 Acre Feet to EML by water rights deeds 
separate from the Warranty Deed conveying the Land. While that is indeed what occurred, that is 
not the conveyance in controversy. All parties agree that EML acquired both the Land and the 160 
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Acre Feet from the Berrys. Section 73-1-11 requires the Court to determine the effect of what 
occurred next-namely, EML's conveyance of the Land to the Lenders by way of the Trust Deed. If 
the 160 Acre Feet were appurtenant, as defined by Section 73-1-1 l(5)(b), to the Land at the time of 
the Trust Deed, they were included in the conveyance effected by the Trust Deed as a matter of law. 
Both the City and Richards argue that the Berrys effected a "severance" of the 160 Acre Feet from 
the Land. The Court need not make any determination on that issue because Section 73-1-1 l(5)(b) 
controls what water rights are included in a land conveyance after May 4, 1998. It provides as 
follows: 
For purposes of land conveyances only, a water right evidenced by any of the 
following documents is appurtenant to land: . . . (ii) a certificate issued under Section 
73-3-17 . . . (vi) an approval for an application to permanently change the place of 
use of water issued under Section 73-3-10 . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-1 l(5)(b). 
There is no dispute that the Berrys held a certificate issued by the State Engineer under 
Section 73-3-17 for the 160 Acre Feet. There is no dispute that the Berrys obtained an approval 
from the State Engineer under Section 73-3-10 to permanently change the place of use of the 160 
Acre Feet. Either of those regulatory acts suffices to make the 160 Acre Feet appurtenant to the Land 
"for purposes of land conveyances only" as prescribed by Section 73-1-1 l(5)(b). The Court 
therefore concludes as a matter of law that the Trust Deed conveyed the 160 Acre Feet. 
6. Parol Evidence of Parties' Intent or Understanding. Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-11 does 
not contain any exception based on the intent of the parties other than the three exceptions quoted 
above (reserving the water right, conveying only a part thereof or conveying the water right by a 
separate conveyance prior to or contemporaneous with the land conveyance). The Court has no 
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power to amend the statute or to engraft upon it additional exceptions not contained in the plain 
language of the statute. Thus, the following analysis of parol evidence and interpretation issues is 
an alternative basis for the Court's decision that the Trust Deed included the 160 Acre Feet. 
The City and Richards argue that the Court should consider extrinsic evidence of the parties' 
"intent" such as preliminary discussions and negotiations regarding the collateral to be provided for 
the Loan, claiming the Trust Deed to be ambiguous. The thrust of such evidence is that the Lenders 
did not intend to receive the 160 Acre Feet as collateral because they were to receive, in exchange 
for giving up that water right, 1125 acre feet of water rights that are listed in the Note. The Court 
notes that "[t]he basic rule of contract interpretation is that the intent of the parties is to be 
ascertained from the content of the instrument itself, the rationale for the rule being to preserve the 
sanctity of written instruments." Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060, 1062 (Utah 1981). 
The Trust Deed includes all of the following in addition to the Land: 
all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon and all water rights, rights of way, 
easements, rents, issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and 
appurtenances thereunto belonging, now or hereafter used or enjoyed with said 
property, or any part thereof.... 
The phrase "all water rights . . . thereunto belonging" is not ambiguous. See Spears v. Warr, 2002 
UT 24, ^ j40 (similar deed language ruled unambiguous); Loosle v. First Fed Sav. & Loan, 858 P.2d 
999, 1003 (Utah 1993) ("pursuant to section 73-1-11, a perfected water right will pass as an 
appurtenance without specifically mentioning the vested water right. . . . " ) . 
A finding of ambiguity after a review of relevant, extrinsic evidence is appropriate only when 
"reasonably supported by the language of the contract." Dainesv. Vincent
 9 200% \JT 51,%L7. Thus, 
a claim of ambiguity in contractual language must be "plausible and reasonable" in light of the 
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language used. Id f31. The evidence of intent offered by the City and Richards may not be 
considered absent ambiguity in the language of the Trust Deed. 
A trial court may not consider parol evidence of intent without first finding ambiguity 
in the language of a contract. And, while relevant evidence proffered to demonstrate 
the alleged facial ambiguity must be considered, our analysis of such evidence is 
strictly limited to the determination of the existence of facial ambiguity and is 
"ultimately circumscribed by the language of the agreement." See Dairies, 2008 UT 
51,P28, 190 P.3d 1269. 
Flores v. Earnshaw, 2009 UT App 90, 209 P.2d 428, 433. 
The City and Richards have failed to show any plausible and reasonable interpretation of the 
Trust Deed that would exclude the 160 Acre Feet. They argue, however, that the recital in the Note 
stating that it is secured by the 1125 acre feet creates an ambiguity in the Trust Deed. No ambiguity 
is created by the language of the Note. Since the Note recited that it was secured by Parcel No. 59-
019-0001 (which included all improvements, appurtenant water rights, and all other appurtenances), 
there was no reason to repeat the description of improvements or appurtenances in the Note. Thus, 
the Note itemized only the non-appurtenant water rights (the 1125 acre feet). There is no conflict 
between the Trust Deed and the Note with respect to the inclusion (in both documents) of 
appurtenant water rights. Since the Court is unable to find ambiguity in the Trust Deed, parol 
evidence of intent contrary to the language of the Trust Deed may not be considered. 
7. Interpretation of the Trust Deed. The operative language states that EML conveys 
the Land "[tjogether with . . . all water rights . . . and appurtenances thereunto belonging, now or 
hereafter used or enjoyed with said property, or any part thereof." The City argues that the Land was 
not being irrigated at the exact moment of EML's purchase and that, as a result the Trust Deed does 
not encumber the 160 Acre Feet. The City also asserts that the water rights have not been used on 
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the Land at any time since the recording of the Trust Deed. The Court rules as a matter of law that 
the elements of this language are disjunctive, such that water rights included with the Land are those 
"thereunto belonging/' or "now or hereafter used," or "enjoyed with said property." See, Doctors' 
Co. v. Drezga, 2009 UT 60, T[ 11, 218 PJd 598 (Utah 2009) ("the contract uses clearly disjunctive 
language, indicating that TDC can either rescind or cancel the policy, but cannot do both."); In re 
A.M., 2009 UT App 118,114,208 P.3d 1058; Home Sav. and Loan v. Aetna Cas. AndSur. Co., 817 
P.2d 341 (Utah App. 1991); Berger v. Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co., 723 P.2d 388,390 (Utah 1986). 
Even if the disjunctive is ignored and inquiry is made as to whether the water rights fit within 
the term "now used" on the Land as of May 2007, the City's interpretation of "now" is artificial and 
unreasonably narrow. The City suggests "now" means only "today" or on the date of the Trust Deed. 
The Random House Dictionary of the English Language, 2nd Ed. Unabridged (1987) includes among 
the definitions of "now": 
3. at this time or juncture in some period under consideration or in some course of 
proceedings described: The case was now ready for the jury. 4. at the time or 
moment immediately past: I saw him just now on the street. 5. in these present 
times; nowadays: Now you rarely see horse-drawn carriages. 6. under the present 
existing circumstances; as matters stand: I see now what you meant. 
Several of the foregoing usages would mean that the water rights had been used "now," including 
those numbered 3 and 4 (the time period under consideration including the most recent past watering 
season) and 6 (the water could be used under the then existing circumstances, as matters stood on 
the date of the closing of the Loan). 
The term "now" must be applied in context of the appurtenant water rights, which can be 
used only between April and October. There is no dispute that the water was used on the land in 
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2006. The Trust Deed was made in May 2007, early in the six-month period of permitted use in 
2007. The Court must apply a practical and reasonable definition of the term "now" in construing 
the Trust Deed. Thus, the 160 Acre Feet were in use substantially contemporaneously with the 
execution of the Trust Deed and were therefore included within the granting clause. 
8. Statute of Frauds. The City and Richards ask the Court to enforce a claimed oral 
agreement between EML and Lenders whereby Lenders supposedly agreed to give up a lien on the 
160 Acre Feet and EML was to grant them a lien on the 1125 acre feet. Those water rights are 
interests in real property (see In re Bear River Drainage Area, 271 P.2d 846 (Utah 1954)) and 
therefore subject to the statute of frauds.8 Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 provides that "[n]o estate or 
interest in real property . . . shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise 
than by act or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, 
granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same." Since there is no document in evidence 
constituting a deed or conveyance of the 1125 acre feet to Lenders, the Court rejects all claims by 
Richards and the City that the Lenders obtained a lien thereon. In addition, since the Court 
concludes that the Trust Deed included the 160 Acre Feet, any surrender of Lenders' interest therein 
must be accomplished in a writing signed by Lenders to be valid. No such writing is in evidence. 
Not only is the Note not signed by Lenders (see Eldridge v. Farnsworth, 2007 UT App 243, \ 30, 
166 P.3d 639), but it also does not purport to surrender an interest in the 160 Acre Feet conveyed to 
them by the Trust Deed. The Court should not consider the alleged oral agreement relied upon by 
8
 See Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-10 (l)(a) ("A water right. . . shall be transferred by deed in 
substantially the same manner as is real estate."). 
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the City and Richards. See Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3. Neither the City nor Richards has claimed that 
Lenders have waived the statute of frauds regarding the oral contract or that promissory estoppel 
applies. See Eldridge v. Farnsworth, supra, ^ 29-32. 
9. Fraudulent Transfer. Lenders' fraudulent transfer claim is asserted in the alternative 
to their claim that the Trust Deed includes the 160 Acre Feet. Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-6 provides 
the following definition as to when a transfer is fraudulent as to creditors: 
(1) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a 
creditor whose claim arose before the transfer was made or the obligation was 
incurred if: 
(a) the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation without 
receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or 
obligation; and 
(b) the debtor was insolvent at the time or became insolvent as a result 
of the transfer or obligation. 
The 160 Acre Feet that EML purported to transfer to its sister company, Circle of Builders, on June 
22, 2007, had a value at that time of $1,920,000. Declaration of Paul W. Throndsen. The 
undisputed evidence is that EML received nothing in return for that transfer.9 Thus, it did not receive 
a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the 160 Acre Feet. The debtor, EML, was either 
already insolvent at the time of that transfer or was rendered insolvent by it, as shown by the facts 
that: (1) its only remaining asset, the Land, was worth $1,990,000 at that time; (2) it was indebted 
9
 Richards contends that EML received the 1125 acre feet of water rights in exchange. As 
discussed above, there is no evidence that Circle of Builders conveyed that water right to EML. 
Absent a signed conveyance in writing, no "exchange" would be effective. Utah Code Ann. § 
25-5-1. Moreover, the evidence is undisputed that Circle of Builders transferred the 1125 acre 
feet to Mark and Brenda Rindlesbach. Jones Depo. Exh. 7. 
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to Lenders in the amount of $3,349,183.38; (3) it was indebted to Summit 1031 Exchange, LLC in 
the amount of $637,875 (plus interest accrued from May 21,2007); and (4) it was indebted to Steven 
Glade Berry in the amount of $212,625 (plus interest accrued from May 21,2007). These three debts 
amounted to $4,199,683.38 (plus interest on $850,500 for 32 days at 12% per annum). Thus, EML's 
debts exceeded the value of its assets on June 22, 2007, by more than $2.2 million. This clearly 
satisfies the definition of insolvency in Utah Code §25-6-3(1). 
Richards and the City contend that they gave value in good faith in exchange for the portions 
of the 160 Acre Feet ultimately received by them and therefore are entitled to a lien for that value. 
Neither of them has submitted any admissible evidence that they gave value or what the amount of 
/ that value was.10 Both of them fail to satisfy the statutory requirement of Utah Code § 25-6-9(4) that 
the value must be given to the debtor, which in this case is EML. Whatever the City or Richards 
gave to Circle of Builders, if anything, is irrelevant. They gave nothing to EML and therefore have 
no statutory lien right. 
During oral argument the City contended for the first time that the Court cannot set aside the 
transfer of water rights by EML as fraudulent because the City is a good faith purchaser for value. 
The City has provided no authority for this argument and did not assert it as a defense in its Answer. 
Further, the City has presented no evidence that it gave value for the water rights transferred to it by 
Circle of Builders or that it was an innocent purchaser. The Court therefore cannot consider the 
10
 Richards submits an unauthenticated agreement, to which Lenders object for lack of 
foundation and on the basis that it constitutes hearsay. Inasmuch as those evidentiary objections 
are meritorious, the Court declines to consider that agreement. Even if it did, however, the 
agreement shows no value being conferred on EML by Richards giving up his ownership 
interests in multiple companies operated by Robert Jones. 
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City's argument for lack of a basis in the pleadings and for lack of legal and factual support. 
Both Richards and the City argue that Lenders consented to EML giving away $1,920,000 
worth of water rights to a sister company for no consideration, leaving EML insolvent and incapable 
of paying its debt to Lenders. Although Lenders were apparently willing to accept the 1125 acre feet 
instead of the 160 Acre Feet, they never received the 1125 acre feet and thus retained their rights to 
the 160 Acre Feet. Even if they had agreed not to include the 160 Acre Feet in the Trust Deed, there 
is no evidence that Lenders authorized their borrower, EML, to give away its assets without 
receiving equivalent value in exchange. 
Lenders have established all of the statutory requirements for avoidance of EML's transfer 
of the 160 Acre Feet to Circle of Builders as a fraudulent transfer. Summary judgment should be 
granted in favor of Lenders on their fraudulent transfer claim in the alternative to their foreclosure 
claim. Any sale of the water rights conducted by the Sheriff in accordance with a decree of 
foreclosure shall be deemed, in the alternative, to be a valid execution sale of such water rights. 
The Court will issue a judgment and decree of foreclosure consistent with the foregoing 
Order determining that the Trust Deed is prior and superior to the interests of all Defendants with 
respect to the Land and the remaining banked entitlements (106.72 acre feet) of the 160 Acre Feet 
that Lenders have not heretofore released and directing the Sheriff of Utah County to sell the Land 
and such banked entitlements. Within 10 days after entry of this Order, Lenders' counsel shall 
submit a proposed Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure including an amount for Lenders' attorney 
fees and expenses, along with an affidavit or declaration itemizing the attorney fees and costs 
incurred in connection with this action. Any objections to either document shall be served within 5 
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days pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f)(2). The Court may resolve any such objections without further 
hearing. 
Dated this day of January, 2011 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable Steven L. Hansen 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing was served by mailing the same on 
January 4, 2011, addressed to each of the following: 
Matt C. Osborne 
Osborne & Barnhill, P.C. 
11576 South State Street, 
Building 204 
Draper, Utah 84010 
Gerald H. Kinghorn 
Jeremy R. Cook 
Parsons, Kinghorn Harris 
111 East Broadway, 11th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Homespin, LLC 
c/o Steven T. Gyuro 
951 Highland Oaks Drive 
Bountiful, UT 84010 
^ _ 
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